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MEANING OF "JURISDICTION OF SUBJECT MATTER"
Collins V. Collins,
14 Ill. 2d 271, 151 N.E.2d 813 (1958)
Plaintiff had obtained a decree of divorce in the circuit court on the
ground that her husband had been guilty of "habitual drunkenness for
the space of two years and upward"' subsequent to the marriage.
Plaintiff filed a petition' to vacate the divorce decree alleging that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because the
complaint showed on its face that the parties could not possibly have
been married for a space of two years preceding the commencement of
the divorce action.3 The Supreme Court of Illinois, reversing the
appellate court4 and affirming the circuit court, upheld the plaintiff's
contention,5 two judges dissenting.
It is well established that if a court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties its decree cannot be collaterally attacked no matter
how erroneous the decree may be.6 There is no question that the court
had jurisdiction of the parties in the instant case. The only problem is
whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Many decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in accordance
with the weight of authority,' have stated that jurisdiction of subject
matter is the power of the court to hear and determine the general
1 This is one of the grounds for divorce as provided in ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
40, § 1 (1955).
2Although plaintiff's petition to vacate the decree would be considered by
many courts as a "direct" rather than a "collateral attack," previous Illinois cases
have classified such petitions as collateral attacks. The statute which makes this
result possible in Illinois is ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1955). See Note, The
Value of the Distinction Between Direct and Collateral Attacks on Judgments,
66 YALE L.J. 526 (1957).
3 The complaint for divorce was filed and summons served on June 25,
1955. It was stated in the complaint that the parties were married December 23,
1953; the decree of divorce was entered July 26, 1955.
4 Collins v. Collins, 14- Ill. App. 2d 350, 144 N.E.2d 845 (1957).
5 The majority opinion stated, "The complaint thus shows affirmatively on
its face that the habitual drunkenness alleged could not possibly have existed for
the space of two years subsequent to the marriage and prior to the date of filing
the complaint for divorce. Hence the complaint does not allege a 'case of divorce'
allowed by our Divorce Act, and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of
the cause." Collins v. Collins, 14 Ill. 2d 271, 151 N.E.2d 813 (1958).
6 Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435, 44 N.E.2d 54 (1942); Sheahan v.
Madigan, 275 11. 372, 114 N.E. 135 (1916); O'Brien v. People ex rel. Kellog
Switchboard & Supply Co., 216 Ill. 354, 75 N.E. 108 (1905). It is equally well
established that when a judgment is entered by a court having no jurisdiction to
hear and determine a case, it is absolutely void and it may be attacked at any time.
Demilly v. Grosrenaud, 201 Ill. 272, 66 N.E. 234 (1903).
7 Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217 (1878) (a case often cited for its explanation
of jurisdiction of subject matter). See 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 401 (1947) and
cases collected therein.
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question involved; 8 it is the power to act upon the abstract question
regardless of whether the plaintiff has a good cause of action.' In
People ex rel. Courtney v. Prystalski, ° the court held that, "Jurisdiction
of a court to hear and determine a cause does not depend upon actual
facts alleged but upon authority to determine existence or nonexistence of
such facts and render judgment according to such findings." (Emphasis
added.)
In the instant case, it was held that since the complaint does not
allege a "case of divorce," the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of
the cause. This statement is inconsistent with prior Illinois decisions"
which hold that jurisdiction of the subject matter is not dependent upon
a good cause of action in the complaint or the sufficiency of the com-
plaint but upon the court's authority to hear the case.
12
The majority, in support of its position, cites Bennet v. Bennet,1
a West Virginia case, which held that where there is no pleading to
warrant a decree it is not merely voidable but void. The holding in the
Benmet case is inconsistent with Ward v. Sampson 4 in which the Su-
preme Court of Illinois refused to allow a collateral attack on a divorce
decree which was rendered on one ground when plaintiff had sought it
on a different ground. It was held that such an erroneous decision was
subject to attack on appeal but not to collateral attack. In that case the
court said, "The authorities establishing the principle that the pleading,
proof and decree must correspond do not hold that the decree is void.
It is merely erroneous."
The importance of the decision in the instant case lies in the fact
that the Supreme Court of Illinois deviated from fundamental concepts
of jurisdiction. The court set aside an erroneous divorce decree holding
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter because
8 Ward v. Sampson, 395 Il. 353, 70 N.E.2d 324 (1946); Ashlock v. Ash-
lock, 360 Ill. 115, 195 N.E. 657 (1935); Woodward v. Ruel, 355 IIl. 163, 188 N.E.
911 (1933).
9 Moore v. Town of Browning, 373 Ill. 583, 27 N.E.2d 533 (1940); Knaus
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 365 Ill. 588, 7 N.E. 298 (1937). See O'Connor v.
Board of Trustees, 247 Ill. 54, 57, 93 N.E. 124-, 125 (1910), in which the court said:
"The proper test as to whether the circuit court had jurisdiction is: Would the court
under any circumstances have the authority to enter such orders and judgments
as it did enter? If it had, then it had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and
the particular questions and circumstances involved and determined in those
cases cannot be inquired into or attacked in a collateral proceeding."
10 358 Ill. 198, 192 N.E. 908 (1934).
11See notes 8-10, supra.
12 It is clear that the circuit court has the authority to hear and determine
divorce cases. "The circuit courts of the respective counties and the Superior
Court of Cook County shall have jurisdiction in all cases of divorce and alimony
allowed by this act." ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 40, § 5 (1955).
13 137 W. Va. 179, 70 S.E.2d 894 (1952). This case is criticized in 55
W. VA. L. Ray. 158 (1952).
14 Supra note 8.
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the complaint was defective on its face. The holding may create serious
questions regarding the validity of title and the legitimacy of children.
Would realty sold by plaintiff's husband after his "divorce" still be
subject to the dower rights of plaintiff? How could an examiner of
titles detect this cloud? Would the children of plaintiff's husband and
a second wife be legitimate? These are but a few of the many problems
that could arise because of this decision.
Aside from the jurisdictional problem presented by this decision, it is
arguable as to whether the outcome of this case is sound from a public
policy standpoint. It is true that the state is a party in all divorce cases
and that it is interested in the protection of the marriage relationship. 5
However, it is difficult to see what public policy considerations would
justify setting aside a decree of divorce in a case such as the instant one
where the divorce was granted, the property rights of the parties settled
by mutual agreement and the parties subsequently relied upon the decree
(plaintiff remarried after the divorce was granted).' 6
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15Johnson v. Johnson, 381 Ill. 362, 45 N.E.2d 625 (1943) ; Leland v. Leland,
319 I1. 426, 150 N.E. 270 (1926); Norwood v. Norwood, 333 Ill. App. 469, 77
N.E.2d 552 (1948).
10 The purpose of this note is not to consider whether the court should have
set aside the divorce decree but to question the basis for the decision in the
instant case, i.e., that the court lacked jurisdiction over the cause. There is also
an interesting question of estoppel in the case which this note does not attempt
to cover. Should the plaintiff have been estopped from setting aside the divorce
decree because she brought the original divorce action which failed to set forth
a good cause of action and testified in support of said complaint? See Jardine
v. Jardine, 291 I1. App. 152, 9 N.E.2d 645 (1937). Should plaintiff have been
estopped because of the mutual property settlement? See Gridley v. Wood, 305
II!. 375, 137 N.E. 251 (1922) and Scott v. Scott, 304 Ill. 267, 136 N.E. 659 (1922).
In the instant case, the supreme court, after stating that defendant had waived
his right to argue estoppel since the issue was not presented in the lower court,
answered the above questions in the negative. Finally, if a proceeding to vacate a
divorce decree were considered a direct instead of a collateral attack in Illinois,
the supreme court could have reached the same result, i.e., vacated the decree,
without relying upon a questionable interpretation of jurisdiction of subject matter.
